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Abstract 
Using the dynamic panel data methods estimated over 2003–2012 on around 16 Tunisian banks, the current paper attempts to 
examine the determinants of households’ non-performing loans (NPLs). The main objective is to investigate the potential effect 
of both macroeconomic and bank-specific variables on the quality of loans. 
Our results indicate the extent to which households’ NPLs in the Tunisian banking system can be explained particularly not only 
by macroeconomic variables (GDP, inflation, interest rates) but also by bad management quality. 
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1. Introduction 
Investigating the factors underlying the ex post credit risk is of a significant importance for regulatory 
authorities who are seeking financial stability and effective banks’ management. In fact, the ex post credit risk is 
expected to be proxied by Non-Performing Loans (NPLs). According to Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), Nkusu (2011) 
and Louzis et al (2012), NPLs can be used to signal the beginning of a banking crisis.  
Taking into consideration the aggregate level of NPLs, most studies having dealt with the determinants of NPLs 
assumed that macroeconomic factors or else bank-specific ones are maintained to be as explanatory determinants. 
However, in their attempt to explain aggregate NPLs of Spanish Commercial and Savings Banks during 1985–1997, 
Salas and Saurina (2002), Mabvure et al (2012) and Louzis et al (2012) have combined both macroeconomic and 
microeconomic variables. Their results indicate that bank-specific determinants are considered as early warning 
indicators for future nonperforming loans. 
It is worth noting that most empirical studies have investigated the influence of the macroeconomic variables on 
NPLs. For instance, working on household NPLs of a set of European countries, Rinaldi and Sanchis-Arellano 
(2006) have come up with empirical evidence that disposable income, monetary conditions and unemployment are 
of great influence on NPLs.  
The literature has signaled the fact that some specific characteristics of banks are linked to loans’ problems. In the 
same sphere, Berger and DeYoung (1997) draw heavily on the relationships between the specific characteristics of 
banks, the efficiency indicators and bad loans. According to them, possible mechanisms are worth formulating. 
More specifically, they maintained that ‘bad luck’, ‘bad management’, ‘skimping’, ‘moral hazard’, and ‘capital 
adequacy’ are all contributing factors leading to problem loans. Working on a sample of US commercial banks over 
the period 1985-1994, Berger and DeYoung (1997), Williams (2004) found out that decrease in measured cost 
efficiency generally led to increased future bad debts. 
In the same vein, conducting a study on the Nordic banking system over the period 1993–2005, Berge and Boye 
(2007), concluded that problem loans are significantly linked to both the real interest rates and unemployment.  
Other studies focusing on the macroeconomic determinants of NPLs include Cifter et al. (2009), Boss et al. (2009), 
Nkusu (2011) and Segoviano et al. (2006). For instance, when dealing with the main Austrian corporate sectors, 
Boss et al. (2009) have investigated the link between credit risks and the business cycle.  
To investigate the link between efficiency and bad loans in the Czech banking industry during 1994-2005, Podpiera 
and Weill (2008) stated that there is a negative relationship between cost efficiency and NPLs. When it comes to the 
Chinese banking system, some authors, such as Li et al., (2007), have shown that incentive contracts have a positive 
impact on the management of NPLs. 
 In the case of Tunisia, when comparing technical efficiency and bad loans in public and private banks in Tunisia 
during 1998-2006, Chaffai and Samia (2013) assumed that public banks are not sensitive to risk, while private banks 
are subject to risk. 
In the Greek banking system during 2003-2011, Louzis et al (2012) have also provided evidence in favor of a 
positive relationship between inefficiency and all NPLs categories. 
The current paper attempts to discuss NPLs from three angles. First, unlike the majority of previous studies which 
focus on aggregate NPLs, the present study attempts to deal with the factors determining household’s NPLs, namely 
the macroeconomic and bank-specific variables affecting NPLs. Second, we consider the Tunisian banking system 
as a benchmark for the study of the non performing loans. Finally, the present study focuses on two types of 
variables: the macroeconomic and the bank-specific variables. The former is referred to as systematic factors and the 
latter is considered as idiosyncratic. Therefore, our aim is to account for the macroeconomic environment and the 
main banking factors affecting NPLs. 
At the methodological level, we have attempted to make a baseline model à la Louzis et al (2012) indicating only 
general macroeconomic variables. Then, it examines the extent to which the addition of bank-specific variables 
contributes to the explanatory power of the model. The focus on the bank-specific determinants goes hand in hand 
with the hypotheses already displayed in the literature. Assuming that the fundamental determinants of NPLs are 
made up of the macroeconomic environment and the business cycle, this approach allows the isolation of the bank-
specific features as they have an effect on NPLs. 
In fact, the literature states that no standardized approach allows analyzing the determinants that affect NPLs. The 
present paper adopts a panel data set comprising sixteen Tunisian banks over the first quarter of 2003 till the fourth 
quarter of 2012.  
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The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 sheds light on the evolution of households’NPLs in the 
Tunisian banking system. Section 3 deals with the empirical findings related to the theoretical part regarding bad 
debts’ determinants. It also displays the hypotheses that relate bank-specific variables to NPLs. Section 4 presents 
the econometric models. Then, Section 5 discusses the results of the data analysis. Ultimately, Section 6 is devoted 
to sum up our findings. 
2. The Tunisian banking system and the evolution of non-performing loans 
Like most developing countries, the banking system in Tunisia plays a major role in the growth of the 
economy. It is considered as a barometer of the health of the economy as a whole. 
This system continued to move due to changes that affect the environment through the reformulation of capital 
markets, bank restructuring and portfolios sanitation of non-performing loans. 
Before the adoption of  a structural adjustment plan in 1986, malfunctions hit the Tunisian financial system due to 
the adoption of a repressive financial policy and the State intervention that led to blocking the investment and 
therefore the economic recession in the country. 
The financial liberalization process is considered as a financial reform that ensures the expansion of the fields of 
action such as the removal of credit management, the liberalization of interest rates whose goal is to clean up the 
Tunisian financial system. 
However, even if the financial liberalization can ensure the elimination of weaknesses in the economy, it can lead to 
panic of banks due to the intervention in risky activities. 
Recently, what have generally affected the performance of the banking system are the NPLs. With reliance 
on the IMF report in 2000, of the total loans, the NPLs’ ratio in the public banks reached 26.8% and was 
about 15.4% in the private banks. Not surprisingly, this ratio is nowadays nearing 19% for both categories 
of banks, which reflects banks’ ongoing and even overinvestment in riskier ventures. These risky 
investments will inevitably decrease both the profitability and the efficiency of the banking industry. 
Therefore, some eminent measures have been currently adopted to improve the efficiency of the banking 
industry. In this sphere, the Tunisian government has recourse to work on reforming the financial sector. 
Hence, the reform has yielded the deregulation of interest rates and the elimination of loans policy. 
The volume of households’ non-performing loans in Tunisia has increased steadily in recent years. The 
increased unpaid credit in Tunisia is essentially the result of the growth of consumer credit. Indeed, 
although the greatest share of unpaid loans (about 80%) is allocated to the productive sector between 2005 
and 2012, the unpaid consumer credit rose more significantly (21%) than the commercial loans (6%) 
(Annual Report of the Tunisian Central Bank Hereafter TCB). 
3. NPLs’ significant variables 
3.1 Macroeconomic variables 
Since the effect of macroeconomic variables and the quality of loans has been the concern of many 
researchers (Louzis et al (2012), Nkusu (2011)), it has been maintained that at the expansionary stage of the 
economy, bad debts are relatively low because both consumers and firms’ revenues do not enable them to repay 
their debts. However, banks allocate credits to lower-quality debtors in times of economic growth. Consequently, 
bad debts are doomed to be multiplied in case of recession.  
According to Carey (1998, p.1382), “the state of the economy is the single most important systematic factor 
influencing diversified debt portfolio loss rates”. 
In fact, the countercyclical variation of bad debts was found in other studies. For instance, Quagliarello’s (2007) 
work confirms the fact that during 1985–2002 most Italian banks’ bad loans were affected by the business cycle. 
Similarly, during 2001–2007, the Turkish financial system has known a lagged effect of industrial production on the 
number of bad loans (Cifter et al. (2009). 
Based on theoretical literature of life cycle consumption models (Modigliani and Miller, 1967) and the business 
cycle theory (Hayek,1940), Salas and Saurina (2002) , Bangia et al (2002, Carey (2002),  mention that GDP growth 
has a significant negative effect on NPLs because the macroeconomic developments make economic agents more 
able to pay back their debt.  
As maintained by Louzis et al (2012), Quagliarello (2007) an expansionary phase of the economy features is 
associated with a low level of NPLs, as household has a sufficient stream of income to cover their debt. If the 
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booming period persists, the level of credit is extended to lower-quality debtors: those debtors become unable to 
service their loan during a recession period because their asset values decrease (Geanakoplos, 2009). 
Salas and Saurina (2002) consider a significant negative effect of GDP growth on bad debts.  
Then, Bangia et al., (2002) and Carey (2002) attribute the rapid transmission of macroeconomic developments to the 
readiness and ability and readiness of economic agents to reimburse their loans.  
The theoretical literature of life-cycle consumption models has revealed an eminent macroeconomic factor of NPLs. 
In this sphere, being subject to the probability of default, (Lawrence, 1995), this model states that low income 
borrowers are expected not to be able to pay back their loans. Therefore, the default in servicing loans is due to the 
large possibility of being unemployed. Similarly, higher interest rates are charged to clients who have risky jobs. 
Extending Lawrence’s model, Rinaldi and Sanchis-Arellano (2006) maintain that the level of default depends on 
both income and the rate of unemployment. This, in turn, has made default intricately related to the uncertainty of 
future income and the rates of lending.  
In the same sphere, research has evidenced the positive relationship between the rate of inflation and bad loans. For 
instance, Fofack (2005) maintains that inflationary pressures have an effect on causing people to make bad loans in 
some Sub-Saharan African countries. Accordingly, Fofack (2005) considers inflation as one of the eminent causes 
for the rapid loss of commercial banks’ own funds, which brings about higher credit risk. 
Other macroeconomic variables can provide supplementary information about the impact of macroeconomic 
conditions on household such as unemployment and interest rates. 
Referring to the literature cited above, we use the GDP growth, the inflation rate and the real lending rate as the 
crucial macroeconomic determinants of households’ NPL. 
3.2 Bank specific variables 
Berger and Deyoung (1997), Louzis et al (2012) among others are not likely to exclusively consider NPLs’ 
determinants among macroeconomic factors as they are found exogenous to the banking industry. In fact, each 
bank’s policy choices, such as the emphasis on improving efficiency and the risk management, along with the 
typical features of the banking sector are expected to influence the evolution of NPLs.  
The relashionship between NPL and bank specific factors has been indicated by Berger and Deyoung (1997), Louzis 
et al (2012) and Sabbah .G (2013) who investigated the relationship between loan quality, cost efficiency and bank 
capital. In fact, Berger and Deyoung (1997) attribute the NPLs level to bad management, skimping and moral 
hazard. With reference to Louzis et al’s (2012) work, this study sets forth the following six hypotheses, the aim of 
which is to test the flow of causality between these variables: 
H1: “Bad management hypothesis”: a high level of NPL is justified by inefficient skills in credit scoring, bad 
control of borrowers, and lack of collaterals (Podpiera and Weil, 2008).  
H2: ‘Skimping’ hypothesis: high level of efficiency leads to an increase in NPLs. 
Conforming to this view, loan quality and the cost efficiency are both affected by the share of resources specified to 
underwriting and monitoring loans. 
In this sense, the less effort banks devote to ensure higher loan quality, the more cost-efficient they will be and the 
more the number of NPLs will be in the long term.  
H3‘Moral hazard’ hypothesis’: Banks’ low-capitalization causes increasing numbers of NPLs. 
A bank which is thinly capitalized may suffer from high volume of NPLs. This moral hazard incentive of managers 
led to an excessive risk and an increase in the volume of NPL (Salas and Saurina, 2002). 
Furthermore, other bank specific factors have an impact on NPLs such as bank diversification opportunity and bank 
size. The link between those factors and NPLs is ambiguous in its direction. Hu et al (2004) mentioned that large-
sized banks allow managers to evaluate loan and devote more resources. In fact, according to Salas and Saurina 
(2002), bank size is negatively associated with a high volume of NPLs.  
Berger and DeYoung (1997) evidenced the ‘bad management’ hypothesis, stating the negative association of cost 
efficiency with NPLs. They also confirmed the moral hazard hypothesis. Similarly, Podpiera and Weill’s (2008) 
results corroboratewith the bad management hypothesis. In the same sphere, Salas and Saurina’s (2002) findings 
revealed a statistically insignificant effect of shifted efficiency on problem loans.  This may be due to the 
counteraction of the ‘bad management’ and ‘skimping’ effects. Besides, their findings are consistent with the moral 
hazard hypothesis as they indicated a statistically significant negative effect of the shifted solvency ratio on NPLs. 
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Therefore, as the opportunities of banks’ diversification can be correlated with the quality of loans, we anticipate 
that there exists a negative relation between diversification and NPLs. According to Louzis et al (2012) and 
Mabvure (2012), this is true because diversification decreases credit risk. 
In this sphere, taking bank size as an approximate measure for diversification opportunities, authors found a 
negative relation between bank size and NPLs (Salas and Saurina, 2002;  Hu et. al.,2004 and Rajan and Dhal, 2003). 
These authors maintain that the big sized  banks’ yield more diversification opportunities.   
However, the non-interest income can also be considered as a proxy for diversification opportunities since it 
indicates a share of total income. This is true because it reflects that banks rely on other types of income, but not on 
loan making i.e., on diversified sources of income. As for the US banking system, research has not evidenced 
benefits from diversification in reduced risk. According to Stiroh (2004a) non-interest income growth was fine tuned 
with net interest income during the 1990s.  
On this basis, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
 H4‘Diversification’ hypothesis: There exists a negative relationship between bank size and NPLs.  
In fact, the relationship between lagged measures of performance and problem loans has remained ambiguous. Thus, 
in the context of lending activities, it is maintained that bad performance may indicate lower quality of skills, which 
sounds similar to the ‘bad management’ hypothesis). 
This indicates a negative link between past earnings and problem loans. 
H5 ‘Bad management II’ hypothesis: There exists a negative relationship between performance and NPLs 
By analogy with the ‘bad management’ hypothesis, H5 may be justified on the basis that past performance can be 
taken as a proxy for the quality of management. 
In fact, with reference to model, the reversed situation, i.e., the effect of the quality of management on performance 
remains possible. This is shown in Rajan’s (1994) attempt to shed light on the correlation between changes in credit 
policy and demand conditions. In this model, credit policy is determined by rational banks’ emphasis on the short-
term reputation, and not solely by the maximization of banks’ earnings.  
On this basis, management is expected to manipulate current earnings with reliance on a more liberal credit policy. 
In this sphere, banks are likely to enhance their profitability in the market by inflating current earnings with no 
regard to future problem loans. Similarly, for a bank to increase its current earnings, it may resort to adopt loan loss 
provisions. In this sense, it is assumed that past earnings may be positively linked to future NPLs: 
 H6 ‘Procyclical credit policy’ hypothesis: there exists a negative relationship between performance and future 
increases in NPLs. 
In short, Table 1 presents the bank specific variables used in the econometric analysis and their corresponding 
specific hypothesis. 
 
Table 1:  Definition of variables used to test the various hypotheses. 
Variables Definition References hypothesis tested expected sign 
     
ROE 
ܴܱܧ௜ǡ௧ ൌ
ܲݎ݋݂݅ݐݏ௜௧
ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ௜௧
 
Louzis et al (2012), 
Moukhtar M (2012) 
-Bad management 
-Procyclical credit 
policy 
 (-) 
 (+) 
Solvency Ratio 
ܴܵ௜௧ ൌ
݋ݓ݊݁݀ܿܽ݌݅ݐ݈ܽ௜௧
ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜௧
 
Louzis et al (2012), 
Sabbah G (2013) 
Moral hazard  (-) 
Inefficiency 
ܫ݊݁ ௜݂௧ ൌ
݋݌݁ݎܽݐ݅݊݃ܧݔ݌݁݊ݏ݁ݏ௜௧
݋݌݁ݎܽݐ݅݊݃݅݊ܿ݋݉݁௜௧
 
Louzis et al (2012) Bad management 
Skimping 
(+) 
(-) 
Size 
ܵ݅ݖ݁௜௧ ൌ
ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜௧
σ ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜௧ଵ଺௜ୀଵ
 
Louzis et al (2012), 
Sabbah G (2013) 
Diversification (-) 
After reviewing the macroeconomic determinants and the main bank-specific variables as factors of household’s 
non-performing loans, it sounds interesting to empirically validate our hypotheses in the case of the Tunisian 
Banking system.  
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4. Econometric models specification 
On the basis of the studies of Louzis et al (2012), Sabbah (2013); Merkl and Stolz, (2009) cited in recent 
literature, we have applied a dynamic panel data approach to explain the determinants of the households’ NPL in the 
Tunisian banking system. Hence, the baseline model is displayed as follows: 
  TtNiuXLYY itiititit ,...,1;,...,1,1 ,1     %DHED                (1) 
where i denotes the cross sectional and t refers to time dimension of the panel, ௜ܻ௧ is the change in the NPLs, ȕ(L) is 
the 1×k lag polynomial vector, ௜ܺ௧ is the k×1 vector of explanatory variables other than ௜ܻ௧ିଵ, ui are the unobserved 
heterogeneity (i.e., bank-specific effects) and  ௜௧ is the usual error term. 
The first difference transformation of Eq. (1) allows us to eliminate the bank specific effects. Thus, the Eq. (1) 
becomes: 
  itititit XLyy HED ''' ' 1                   (2) 
with ǻ  refers to the first difference operator.  
To estimate the Eq. (2), we use the GMM system developed by Bundell-Bond (1998). The main objective is to 
estimate a system consisting of an equation in levels (with lagged first differences as instruments) and an equation in 
first differences (with lagged levels as instruments). This technique ensures that we avoid the problem of 
endogeneity and the correlation of the bank specific effect with the error term. Moreover, it has been shown that this 
approach provides more consistent estimators*. 
4.1 Estimation methodology 
Eq. (1) takes the following form in our baseline model: 
iti
j j j
jitjjtjjtjitit uRLRInfGDPNPLNPL HEEED ''' ' ¦ ¦ ¦
   

2
1
2
1
2
1
3211                 (3) 
40,...,1 and 16,...,1,1   ti%D  
      
where, ο୧୲ is the change of the households’ non-performing loans ratio, ο
୲ is the real GDP growth rate, 
ο୲ is the first difference of the inflation rate and ǻ୧୲ is the change in the real lending rate.  
In addition, we have also introduced in the baseline model (Eq. 3) the bank-specific variables in order to examine 
their explanatory power. Therefore, the number of cross sectional makes restrictions on the number of the adopted 
instruments in the estimation and consequently on the number of exogenous determinants that might be added to Eq. 
(3). Relying on Judson and Owen’s (1999) work, we construct a ‘‘restricted’’ GMM procedure. That is to say, in 
order to reduce the need of additional instruments, we have just introduced a limited number of lagged regressors 
variables. Therefore, we have introduced only one bank-specific variable in our baseline model in order to reduce 
the number of instruments. This approach, we ensure that the number of instrument does not exceed the number 
cross sections. Thus, in an attempt to account for the additional microeconomic variable, we extend the baseline 
model in Eq. (3): 
iti
j
jitj
j j j
jitjjtjjtjitit uXRLRInfGDPNPLNPL HEEEED ''' ' ¦¦ ¦ ¦
 

   

4
1
4
2
1
2
1
2
1
3211         
(4)        
Where ୧୲ is a matrix containing all bank-specific variables described in Table 1 above .  
To obtain the dynamics of explanatory variables over the previous year, we apply four lags for the bank-specific 
 
 
*For more details on the various econometric techniques used to estimate this type of model, the work of Louzis et al., (2012) is worth referring 
to. 
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regressors (Louzis et al, 2012; Berger and DeYoung, 1997) but in the case of “size”, we utilize only its 
contemporaneous value.  
On this basis, the current level of the bank specific variables does not have an effect on the ratios of the current level 
of NPL. This could be explained partly by the nature of the accounting data and partly by the time required for 
managerial decisions.  
In our specification, we maintain that macroeconomic determinants are exogenous. However, the assumption of 
strict exogeneity of the bank-specific variables seems to be very strong. Louzis et al (2012) stated that bank specific 
variables can be considered as forward-looking, implying that banks’ management, in the course of decision making 
process, takes into account the expected future level of NPLs. However, banks do not consider future random shocks 
to NPLs as they can not anticipate unpredictable shocks. Therefore, we confirm that there exists a weak form of 
exogeneity for bank specific variables, which implies the existence of an endogeneity problem in terms of current 
and past realizations of the error term. But, Bobba and Coviello (2007) stated that there is no correlation between 
bank-specific variables and future shocks in NPLs. Consequently, to correct this econometric problem we use the 
lagged bank-specific variables according to this expression : > @ sTtXE itsit  allfor  and ,...,3 ,0   ' H . 
5. Data description and empirical findings 
5.1. Data description 
In the current paper, we consider a panel of sixteen Tunisian banks observed over the period 2003Q1-
2012Q4. 
Table 2 below presents the descriptive statistics of households’ NPLs for all sixteen banks. The results show that the 
average of NPL ratio of the studied sample is about 0.0002476. The minimum value of the recorded ratio of NPLs is 
0 while the maximum is 0.0629. Although the average rate of household’s NPLs is low, the banking sector in 
Tunisia is still characterized by a high level of NPLs. 
Table2. Descriptive statistics for the household’s οNPL 
Mean                                0.0002476 
Maximum                        0.0629131 
Minimum                        0 
St.dev                              0.0086924 
 
NPL ratios are revealed in Fig.1. We note that the curve exhibits an upward trend for the period of 2003 and 2012. 
 
             Fig.1 Household NPL ratio 
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
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5.2 Empirical findings 
5.2.1 Models with macroeconomic variables  
Estimation results for the baseline model with macroeconomic variables and the others models incorporating bank-
specific variables are shown in Table 3. 
Table3. GMM estimation results for the model  
 Baseline 
Model 
 Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
οࡺࡼࡸ࢏࢚ି૚ +2364826 
(0.056)** 
 -.4180488 
(0.096)* 
 -.2919261 
(0.000)*** 
 -.3722471 
(0.035)** 
 -.3375651 
(0.056)** 
οࡳࡰࡼ࢚ି૚ -.040297 
(0.011)*** 
 -.0445864 
(0.027)** 
 -.152659 
(0.105)* 
 .0361729 
(0.616) 
 -.0592334 
(0.053)** 
οࡳࡰࡼ࢚ି૛ -.043487 
(0.027)** 
 -.0805662 
(0.523) 
 -.0326769 
(0.761) 
 .1251327 
(0.347) 
 -.0863728 
(0.236) 
οࡵ࢔ࢌ࢚ି૚ .0065433 
(0.022)** 
 .0077919 
(0.045)** 
 -.0038023 
(0.734) 
 .0064986 
(0.014)*** 
 .0018711 
(0.551) 
οࡵ࢔ࢌ࢒࢚ି૛ .004175 
(0.096)* 
 .00022645 
(0.927) 
 .0066627 
(0.031)** 
 .002716 
(0.516) 
 .0047363 
(0.079)* 
ࡾࡸࡾ࢏࢚ି૚ .0012885 
(0.089)* 
 .0005628 
(0.001)*** 
 .0022551 
(0.036)** 
 .0012135 
(0.056)** 
 .0010526 
(0.081)* 
ࡾࡸࡾ࢏࢚ି૛ .0008317 
(0.061)* 
 .0000935 
(0.913) 
 .0012479 
(0.135) 
 .0005865 
(0.492) 
 .0004753 
(0.254) 
 ܴܱܧ௜௧ିଵ 
 
-.496375 
(0.077)* 
ܫ݊݁ ௜݂௧ିଵ 
 
.1550347 
(0.024)** 
ܴܵ௜௧ିଵ 
 
-.0279398 
(0.684) 
݈݈ܶܽ݅݁௜௧ 
 
.2026706 
(0.079)* 
 ܴܱܧ௜௧ିଶ .4864191 
(0.307) 
ܫ݊݁ ௜݂௧ିଶ 
 
-.1359985 
(0.223) 
ܴܵ௜௧ିଶ 
 
-.0774843 
(0.039)** 
  
 
 ܴܱܧ௜௧ିଷ 
 
.4080851 
(0.636) 
ܫ݊݁ ௜݂௧ିଷ 
 
.0029507 
(0.942) 
ܴܵ௜௧ିଷ -.161562 
(0.427) 
  
 ܴܱܧ௜௧ିସ 
 
-.0929813 
(0.369) 
ܫ݊݁ ௜݂௧ିସ 
 
-.0157955 
(0.641) 
            
ܴܵ௜௧ିସ 
 
.0294594 
(0.575) 
  
constant .0000377 
(0.904) 
 -.0524484 
(0.530) 
 -.0004985 
(0.841) 
 .0399022 
(0.113) 
 -.0050714 
(0.258) 
AR (1) -2.29 
[0.022] 
 -0.11 
[0.911] 
 -1.68 
[0.093] 
 -0.60 
[0.548] 
 -2.09 
[0.037] 
AR (2) 0.66 
[0.512] 
 -0.70 
[0.482] 
 0.37 
[0.714] 
 0.44 
[0.686] 
 0.07 
[0.941] 
Sargan test 61.19 
[0.645] 
 54.99 
[0.692] 
 59.91 
[0.515] 
 56.51 
[0.639] 
 61.10 
[0.614] 
Hansen test 7.97 
[1.000] 
 5.38 
[1.000] 
 4.06 
[1.000] 
 4.81 
[1.000] 
 6.93 
[1.000] 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Notes: p-values are reported in parenthesis. 
 p-values for the Sargan and the Hansen test are reported in brackets. 
*** Denote significance at 1% respectively. 
**Denote significance at 5% respectively. 
*Denote significance at 10% respectively.                
 
For each model, we also reveal the test results of Sargan and the Hansen are made at the bottom of the table. 
The coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is negative and statistically significant at 5%. The implication is 
that NPLs, due to the write-offs (Sorge and Stronger (2006), Roberto and Ricardo (2012) and Louzis et al (2012)), 
are likely to decrease when they have increased in the previous quarter. 
As for the macroeconomic variables, the estimated coefficients are statistically significant and are compatible with 
the theoretical arguments studied in Section 3. In fact, the slow growth in economy affects negatively the NPL ratio. 
This result signals the strong dependence of the household sector’s ability to repay its loans on the cycle phase. 
Specifically, an increase of one percentage point of GDP leads to a decrease of about 0.040297 in the NPL ratio 
66   Lobna Abid et al. /  Procedia Economics and Finance  13 ( 2014 )  58 – 68 
during the first quarter and about 0.043487 for the second quarter. Thus, the hypothesis that a recession phase has an 
adverse impact on NPLs is confirmed.  
The coefficient of the inflation is a significant indicator of NPLs regarding the consumer loan portfolio. With 
reference to the studies of Rinaldi and Sanchis-Arellano (2006) and Fofac (2005), this finding is consistent with 
previous results. This can be explained by the fact that in Tunisia, the decline in the inflation rate has a positive 
impact on the financial conditions of households and subsequently on the repayment of loans, which explains the 
positive relationship between inflation and NPLs. 
The coefficients for real lending rate (RLR) are positive as previously expected. Consequently, households’ NPLs 
are sensitive to changes in RLR. It is worth signaling that most household credit types are loans with floating rates. 
This assumption is valid when households get loans at varying rates, which may accentuate the monthly repayment 
burden. Consequently, it can lead to an increase in payments i.e., contributing to the higher growth of 
nonperforming loans. Similarly, according to Louzis et al (2012), Roberto and Ricardo (2012) and Sabbah (2013), 
loans for consumption are not easily paid back since banks are likely to adopt severe credit policies during 
recessions.  
5.2.2 Baseline model with bank specific variables  
In this section, we include in our baseline model the bank specific variables. 
Table 3 present the GMM estimation results of NPLs where bank-specific variables are included. As in the baseline 
model, we concentrate on the coefficients in order to determine which of the hypotheses presented in section 3 find 
support in the Tunisian banking system. Therefore, with regard to the tested hypotheses, the empirical evidence is 
based on the sign and the statistical significance of coefficients. 
Furthermore, the incorporation of bank-specific variables in the baseline model does not affect the differential 
quantitative impact of the macro-fundamentals on NPLs. We then remark that the coefficients relating to 
macroeconomic variables remain stable across different models estimated when introducing the bank-specific 
variables. In addition, the estimated coefficients are similar to those estimated in the baseline model. 
It is therefore worth noting that the coefficient of the inefficiency index is positive and statistically significant. 
Hence, our empirical evidence provides support for the ‘bad management’ hypothesis. This result is compatible with 
the finding of Louzis et al (2012) and Derger and Deyoung (1997). It shows that Tunisian banks give credits with 
bad qualities and do not use sophisticated evaluation methods to detect in advance the insolvent creditors. 
However, the risk-taking attitude of banks which is estimated by means of the solvency ratio has a negative and 
significant explanatory power for NPLs. Hence, our result provides support for the ‘moral hazard’ hypothesis and is 
consistent with results of Sala and Saurina (2002). This could be justified by the fact that decision-makers of banks 
with low capital face moral hazard incentives by incurring a high risk of their portfolios, which leads to a higher 
level of NPLs in the Tunisian banking sector.  
Performance indicator (ROE) is found to be significant and negatively related to the NPLs for consumer loans. This 
result is consistent with the model results of Podpierra et Weil (2008), Louzis et al (2012) and provide evidence in 
favor of the ‘the bad management II hypothesis’.  
This means that the quality of management has an impact on the procedures’ efficiency of granting credits to 
households. These procedures are quantitative modeling-based techniques. 
In fact, the "bad management II hypothesis" is empirically verified as lagged inefficiency and found to be positively 
related to NPLs. Therefore, both performance and inefficiency may have an explanatory power over NPLs and can 
be taken as indicators for the quality of management. 
The result also shows a positive effect of size on the NPL. This finding is consistent with that of Garci-Marco and 
Robes Fernandez (2008). Furthermore, the hypothesis of diversification is clearly not accepted. 
6. Conclusion 
In the current study, we have adopted dynamic panel data methods to deal with the determinants of 
household’s NPLs in the Tunisian banking sector. Our findings show that macroeconomic variables, precisely the 
real GDP growth rate, inflation rate and the real lending rate (RLR) have an effect on the level of NPLs. Then, 
performance (measured by ROE) and inefficiency are determined by dividing the operating expenses by the 
operatingincome, known as bank-specific variables, have an additional explanatory power when incorporated in the 
baseline model. These variables support  the ‘bad management’ hypothesis which links these indicators to the 
quality of management.  
67 Lobna Abid et al. /  Procedia Economics and Finance  13 ( 2014 )  58 – 68 
Therefore, our results are mainly significant with regard to the establishment of  regulation policies. So, it is proved 
that the measures of performance and inefficiency are considered as key indicators of future bad loans. In this 
respect, authorities should insist on managerial performance so that they can alleviate potential NPLs increases. 
Moreover, to avoid future financial instability regulators should take into account the systems of risk management 
and the banks’ procedures. 
Thereby, national authorities (the Tunisian Central Bank) and International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2012), being 
subject to excessive rate of non-performing loans of Tunisian banks, recommend the implementation of a policy of 
strict governance. They also suggest solving management problems at banks level to reduce nonperforming loans 
which are counted as sources of vulnerability of the financial system. 
Clearly, as Jan .S (2011) and Melecky and Podpiera (2010) have stated, the relations already discussed can be 
applied for the sake of predicting and stress testing purposes for both regulators and banks. For instance, with regard 
to a macro-stress test, alternative policies can be adopted to assess the convenience of banks’ provisions of loan loss. 
This may serve the evolution of the macro-variables. Then, bank managers may have recourse to other exercises in 
an attempt to evaluate future problems mainly in banks which suffer from relatively low indices of performance and 
efficiency. Finally, what may enhance the reliability of the results is that stress testing exercises should cover 
distinct types of loan portfolios.  
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